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Divine Action, Determinism, and the Laws of Nature, by Jeffrey Koperski. 
Routledge, 2020. Pp. 160. $124.00 (hardcover).
DANIEL RUBIO, Princeton University
Jeffrey Koperski offers a philosopher of science’s intervention in the debate 
over divine action, with the dual purpose of providing a scientifically-his-
torically informed clarification of key concepts such as “determinism” 
and “law of nature,” as well as proposing and defending his “neoclassi-
cal” model of divine action. Koperski frames the debate as between three 
broad factions: interventionists, who believe not only in ongoing divine 
activity that sustains creation, but also special divine action that violates 
the laws of nature; nonviolationists, who believe not only in ongoing 
divine activity that sustains creation, but also special divine action if it 
does not violate the laws of nature; and noninterventionists, who believe 
only in ongoing divine activity that sustains creation, not special divine 
action. Each of these factions is painted as searching for a way between 
the Scylla of Deism and the Charybdis of Occasionalism. Koperski’s own 
view is a novel version of nonviolationism.
The book is clearly written. Koperski relies heavily on examples from 
physics, but the description is usually adequate for non-specialists to 
understand the philosophical point behind the examples, although 
most notably in the chapter on determinism things get somewhat tech-
nical. Philosophers and theologians working on divine action should 
find the book accessible enough, but I  would hesitate to use it in an 
undergraduate course.
The book is organized into several blocs. Chapter one serves to lay out 
the key terms and distinctions that will come up in later chapters. Chapters 
two and three constitute an opinionated introduction to the divine action 
debate, with special focus in chapter three on arguing against the need 
for nonviolationists to rely on genuinely indeterministic interpretations of 
quantum mechanics and/or chaos theory. Chapters four and five focus on 
laws of nature, with four providing history of the concept and five survey-
ing views of the metaphysics of laws of nature, ending in an endorsement 
of decretalism, the 17th-century view that laws of nature are literal divine 
commands regarding how physical objects are meant to move. Chapter 
six is a lengthy discussion of the concept of determinism and its relation-
ship to physics, especially classical mechanics. Chapter seven introduces 
and defends Koperski’s neoclassical theory of divine action, and chapter 
eight deals with some objections.
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In the first key bloc, Koperski’s main concern is to clear enough ground 
to motivate a new account of divine action. The chapters serve this purpose 
adequately. While he critiques a number of views, the focus is on whether 
nonviolationist accounts require quantum mechanics, and in particular 
indeterministic interpretations such as Copenhagen or GRW. The short 
answer is no. In particular, he presses a problem of quantum randomness 
“washing out” at higher levels. Even if there is genuine indeterminism 
at the quantum level, he argues, there are large (though not exhaustive) 
higher level “quantum protectorates” whose properties are not sensitive 
to minor variations at small sizes. Many microstates can fit a single mac-
rostate. Since we are interested in divine action as a macro-phenomenon 
(voices, tongues of flame, healing the sick, etc.) rather than a micro-phe-
nomenon, if the genuine indeterminism is at micro-scales, some kind of 
amplifier is needed to get the openness to divine action that quantum 
indeterminacy is meant to provide into the right levels of reality. While 
these amplifiers are not unheard of, promising candidates such as chaos 
theory do not work. Koperski does not provide a decisive reason to think 
that there aren’t amplifiers out there, but he does enough to motivate a 
view that does not require specific interpretations of quantum mechanics.
The next key bloc discusses the concept of a law of nature, first his-
torically and then by reviewing popular proposals for a metaphysics of 
laws. In particular, Koperski is interested in the historical transition from 
an Aristotelian “powers and liabilities” account of regularities in nature, 
according to which we see regular patterns in the behavior of physical 
objects because of the powers and liabilities inherent in the natures of 
things, to a decretalist account whereby these regularities are produced 
by divine decrees concerning how physical objects should behave. These 
chapters also function as an argument for decretalism.
At the heart of Koperski’s version of decretalism sits Murray Gell-Man’s 
totalitarian principle. While ominous-sounding, it simply states that any-
thing not prohibited from happening eventually will. Thus, according to 
Koperski, the laws of nature guide the evolution of the universe not by 
proclaiming how it must happen, but by setting out how it cannot. This 
means that the true laws look somewhat differently than we typically 
think of them. Newton’s F=ma, for example, is not in the right form for a 
constraining law. Unfortunately, Koperski never provides an example of 
what this kind of law would look like written down. But it would be quite 
different from what we are used to.
The standard dialectic in the metaphysics of laws pits “governing” con-
ceptions of law against Humean ones. For Humeans, laws are parasitic on 
the tapestry of actual objects, properties, and events. They do not guide 
change; they describe and unify it. By contrast, governing conceptions 
of law see the laws as the drivers of change. For Koperski, laws are not 
drivers of change; this role goes to things like forces, energy, and other 
properties of events and objects. But they are not simple, logically strong 
summaries of the Humean mosaic either. They serve to shape the way in 
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which the drivers of change manifest themselves. Like governing laws, 
they partially metaphysically explain why events occur. But they do so by 
blocking certain evolutions rather than by demanding them.
All Koperski needs this section to do is show that there is some reason 
to entertain a decretalist account along the lines of the one he favors. It 
accomplishes this relatively modest goal, though with not much room to 
spare. Some of the critiques of rival accounts of laws fall flat. For instance, 
he accuses David Lewis of substituting law-statements for laws, with 
unfavorable results like the non-existence of laws before there are writ-
ten languages (90). This is an error. For Lewis, laws are propositions (See 
Counterfactuals (Blackwell, 1973), 73) which do not exist only at particular 
times but eternally. Moreover, Lewis’s laws are the axioms of the best sys-
tem from which a complete description of the Human mosaic (the total-
ity of particular matters of fact) can be derived. When Koperski accuses 
Lewis of doing away with laws (90), it is he who mistakes law-statements 
for laws. Or, more accurately, sentences for propositions.
The next bloc discusses determinism, with something of a reverse 
theme of chapter three. In the third chapter, Koperski argued that the reli-
ance on quantum mechanics among nonviolationists was unwarranted, 
because quantum mechanics is not as reliably stochastic as they think. 
Several major interpretations are deterministic, including the increas-
ingly popular Everettian/many-worlds interpretation. In chapter six, 
he argues, classical mechanics is not nearly as deterministic as philos-
ophers make it out to be. The discussion proceeds twofold. On the one 
hand, Koperski explains some well-known bits of philosophy of physics, 
such as the famous “Norton’s Dome” thought experiment, that show that 
classical mechanics is indeed not deterministic in the way philosophers 
typically understand determinism. On the other hand, he argues that the 
motivations for determinism are often methodological. Laws that are not 
deterministic do not make uniform predictions, and so breakdowns of 
determinism are in many cases treated as problems for a physical theory. 
However, if our interest is not in making uniform predictions but in dis-
covering whether or not future facts are fixed by some combination of past 
and present facts that are beyond our control, this is not a good reason to 
make a theory deterministic.
The discussion of the relationship between determinism and classical 
mechanics is sure-footed, historically informed, clear, and reinforces the 
lesson from chapter three that quantum mechanics did not suddenly make 
room for God. However, quantum mechanics was curiously absent from 
this discussion. As we saw in chapter three, some interpretations of quan-
tum mechanics are not deterministic (Copenhagen, GRW) while others 
are deterministic (Bohm, Everett). In chapter six we encounter two early 
modern conceptions of determinism: one, associated with Laplace, where 
a demon with unlimited computational power, complete knowledge of 
the laws, and complete knowledge of the state of the word at one time 
could predict the entire world’s history; another, associated with Leibniz, 
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requires causally sufficient antecedents for any event. Is the determinism 
of the deterministic interpretations of quantum mechanics like these? Or 
is it too, as Koperski convincingly argues in classical mechanics, a prag-
matically-driven “shaping principle”? The significance of the discussion 
of determinism for the main project hangs on the answer to this ques-
tion, because while classical mechanics does not describe our world’s fun-
damental laws, quantum mechanics might. A more direct confrontation 
would have been helpful.
The final bloc of chapters lays out and defends the neoclassical theory 
of divine action that is the book’s main contribution. The view starts with 
a decretalist account of laws. Laws constrain how forces work, but are not 
themselves forces. Laws or systems of laws are deterministic insofar as 
they yield equations with uniform results. In action, the background pic-
ture of laws and determinism looks somewhat like this: consider a single 
particle with set initial conditions that is subject to two forces: gravity and 
electromagnetism. One law tells us how the force of gravity affects the 
particle’s movement. Another law tells us the same for electromagnetism. 
These laws are divine decrees, which say what kinds of entities the rele-
vant forces will affect and how/how not. But the forces themselves do all 
the pushing. These laws combine to give us an equation, which is not itself 
a law, which tells us how the particle will move.
So far so good. Now suppose God wants to use that particle in some 
act, perhaps sending it and a bunch of its particle friends to combine with 
water to make wine. God’s influence on the particle is simply a third force 
acting on it, alongside gravity and electromagnetism. The equation gov-
erning its motion will be different, but neither the laws constraining grav-
ity nor electromagnetism will be altered. In so doing, God neither alters 
nor overrules any of the relevant force laws nor violates determinism in 
Koperski’s sense. This is the neoclassical view of divine action in action.
The remainder of the book is devoted to objections, starting with con-
servation laws. One longstanding worry about divine action is that, since 
God can create energy ex nihilo, divine action will violate various con-
servation laws. In our example above, we might ask: where did the third 
“force” acting on the particle get its energy from? Here Koperski adverts 
to his approach to determinism. Conservation is not forced on us by the 
science, but is a metatheoretical principle governing good scientific prac-
tice. Other objections include a Thomistic concern about God acting as a 
cause in the same way creatures do, a concern that decretalist laws are 
too weak, and that the neoclassical model allows too much latitude for 
noninterventionist divine action, a Humean objection that the neoclassi-
cal model employs a “God of the gaps” methodology, and a concern that 
the neoclassical model is occasionalist. The discussion of these concerns is 
brief, but adequate. For the goal of advancing a new model and showing 
that a reasonable first-pass response may be offered to the most obvious 
objections, it works.
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A Philosophical Theology of the Old Testament: A  Historical, Experimental, 
Comparative and Analytic Perspective, by Jaco Gericke. Routledge Publish-
ing, 2020. Pp. viii + 163. $155.00 (hardcover).
JONATHAN C. RUTLEDGE, University of St. Andrews
Old Testament (OT) scholars and analytic philosophers each employ tech-
nical language in ways that make it difficult for practitioners of one disci-
pline to fully grasp what practitioners of the other discipline are saying. 
The potential for miscommunication between two disciplines, however, is 
a common roadblock for interdisciplinary work in general. But when such 
obfuscating and technical language is combined with caricature and dis-
missive attitudes between two disciplines, the potential for fruitful inter-
disciplinary work moves from merely difficult to practically unimaginable. 
This is the sort of impasse, in Gericke’s estimation, found at the intersection 
of OT scholarship and philosophical theology. In A Philosophical Theology of 
the Old Testament, then, Gericke is self-aware as he enters into this interdis-
ciplinary project between OT scholarship and philosophy, and he painstak-
ingly chisels away at the confusions and befuddlements facing OT scholars 
concerning the nature and possibility of philosophical theology. Importantly, 
Gericke is himself an OT scholar (i.e., with a D.Litt in Semitic languages and 
a Ph.D. in Theology), so he is critiquing a guild from the inside, as it were.
Gericke begins with a chapter in defense of the claim that, as a general 
rule, OT scholars only “rarely, briefly and mostly negatively” speak about 
philosophical theology (1). That is, OT scholars, in Gericke’s experience, 
tend to write off philosophical theology as antithetical to the project of bib-
lical theology. Illustrative of this is the following reference to R. P. Carroll:
In summary: Koperski aims to offer a new model of divine action, in the 
process providing discussions of determinism and laws of nature from a 
philosophy of science perspective. While I remain agnostic as to the ade-
quacy of Koperski’s model, I found its introduction interesting and gen-
erally scientifically and historically well-informed. I would have liked to 
hear more about neoclassical divine action in a world whose fundamen-
tal theory is something like an Everettian or Bohmian theory of quantum 
mechanics, and I thought there were some weaknesses in the discussion 
of the metaphysics of laws of nature. But it is clear to me that Koperski has 
advanced a novel and credible contender for a theory of divine action, and 
that is no small achievement.
